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Abstract
Cooperative behaviours in archaic hunter-gatherers could have been
maintained partly due to the gains from cooperation being shared with
kin. However, the question arises as to how cooperation was main-
tained after early humans transitioned to larger groups of unrelated
individuals. We hypothesize that after cooperation had evolved via
benefits to kin, the consecutive evolution of cognition increased the
returns from cooperating, to the point where benefits to self were suf-
ficient for cooperation to remain stable when group size increased and
relatedness decreased. We investigate the theoretical plausibility of
this hypothesis, with both analytical modeling and simulations. We
examine situations where cognition either (i) increases the benefits
of cooperation, (ii) leads to synergistic benefits between cognitively
enhanced cooperators, (iii) allows the exploitation of less intelligent
partners, and (iv) the combination of these effects. We find that co-
operation and cognition can coevolve - cooperation initially evolves,
favouring enhanced cognition, which favours enhanced cooperation,
and stabilizes cooperation against a drop in relatedness. These results
suggest that enhanced cognition could have transformed the nature of
cooperative dilemmas faced by early humans, thereby explaining the
maintenance of cooperation between unrelated partners.
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1 Introduction1
Hunting and gathering was the main subsistence strategy of archaic humans2
over the last 2 million years, until the advent of agriculture 10 thousand years3
ago (Barker, 2009; Bocquet-Appel, 2011). Modern hunter-gatherer societies4
live in small bands mainly composed of unrelated individuals (Hill et al.,5
2011; Marlowe, 2005). However, the first hunter-gatherers of the genus Homo,6
more than 1.5 million years ago, lived in smaller groups where partners were7
probably more related than in modern hunter-gatherers (Aiello and Dunbar,8
1993; Bittles and Black, 2010; Dunbar, 2009; Hatala et al., 2016; Lalueza-9
Fox et al., 2011). The higher relatedness in archaic hunter-gatherers could10
explain, at least partially, a range of cooperative behaviours, such as group11
hunting and meat sharing, because the benefits of cooperation were likely to12
be shared with relatives (kin selection; Hamilton (1964)). The problem is to13
explain how a similarly high level of cooperation can be preserved during the14
transition to larger groups of unrelated individuals.15
Our hypothesis is that after cooperation had evolved in small groups, via kin16
selection, coevolution with another trait increased the returns from coopera-17
tion, allowing it to be maintained when group size increased and relatedness18
decreased. In particular, we suggest that once cooperation had evolved, nat-19
ural selection favoured additional traits, such as enhanced cognition, which20
increased the efficiency of cooperative behaviours, or even enabled syner-21
gistic effects between individuals involved in cooperative actions, such that22
cognitively enhanced cooperators were able to produce larger benefits than23
without cognition. Examples of such potential traits range from increased24
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relative brain size, changes in brain connectivity and functionality, to genes25
involved in language (Andres et al., 2004; Ferland et al., 2004; Krause et al.,26
2007; Rightmire, 2004; Schoenemann, 2006). These innovations are believed27
to have augmented the social and technical intelligence of early humans, and28
might have been the basis for stone tool technologies, hunting, as well as29
the ability to imagine future outcomes, take the mental perspective of oth-30
ers (Byrne and Whiten, 1989; Dunbar, 1998, 2009; Buss, 2015; Somel et al.,31
2013; Stout et al., 2008, 2015; Tomasello et al., 2005; Whiten and Erdal,32
2012; Vallender et al., 2008; Yeshurun et al., 2007; Byrne and Whiten, 1989;33
Whiten and Byrne, 1997). These enhanced cognitive capacities could have34
transformed the nature of some cooperative dilemmas faced by early humans,35
such that cooperation could still be stable, with low or negligible relatedness.36
However, it is not clear whether cognition can coevolve with cooperation37
in the way that would be required by our hypothesis. While sociality is at38
the center of most explanations for the evolution of cognition (the ‘social39
brain hypothesis’), the role of relatedness between social partners has often40
been argued to be of minor importance, at least in the later stages of human41
evolution (Alexander, 1990; Dunbar, 2009; Tomasello et al., 2012; Whiten42
and Erdal, 2012). Theoretical studies have therefore focused on situations43
where conflict, either within- or between-groups was the underlying factor44
promoting higher cognition (Byrne and Whiten, 1989; McNally et al., 2012;45
McNally and Jackson, 2013; Gavrilets, 2015). Furthermore, higher cognitive46
abilities could enable individuals to generate larger benefits for their group47
and, at the same time, take advantage of their social partners through de-48
3
ception Byrne and Whiten (1989); Whiten and Byrne (1997). Hence, it is49
still unknown what the relationships are between relatedness and the benefits50
from both cooperation and cognition, and under what conditions both traits51
can coevolve and remain stable.52
We test the theoretical plausibility of our hypothesis, by examining when53
cognition can coevolve with cooperation in groups of related individuals, and54
whether this coevolution can stabilise cooperation, even if subsequently relat-55
edness between social partners decreases. In an analytical model, we consider56
different scenarios where cognition allows individuals to (i) gain greater ben-57
efits from cooperation by enabling them to either generate larger gains for58
the same cost (e.g. by predicting a prey’s reactions), (ii) generate synergistic59
benefits as the number of cognitively enhanced individuals increases (e.g.,60
through better coordination and/or communication with each other Boesch61
(2002); Tomasello et al. (2005); Call (2009); Brosnan et al. (2010)), and (iii)62
exploit less intelligent partners through manipulation or deception (Byrne63
and Whiten, 1989; Whiten and Byrne, 1997). Second, we ask whether some64
level of cooperation can be maintained once a cognitive trait has evolved,65
even though group size increases and relatedness decreases. We confirmed66
the robustness of our analytical results with individual-based simulations.67
Although we focus on human cognition, we stress that our theory applies68
more generally to other intelligent species, such as primates and cetaceans,69
where cognition is likely to have evolved in groups of related individuals70
(Boesch, 2002; Smith et al., 1981; Gazda et al., 2005; Pruetz and Bertolani,71
2007).72
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2 Model73
2.1 Model description74
We consider an infinitely large population, which is subdivided into an infi-75
nite number of patches of size n (Wright, 1931). Individuals are haploid, and76
interact socially within patches. We assume that social interactions affect77
an individual’s fecundity. After the social interactions, adults on patches78
produce a very large number of juveniles, and die. Juveniles all disperse to79
some new patch. Competition between juveniles reduces patch size to n indi-80
viduals. We assume that individuals on each patch can be related, although81
we do not yet specify how relatedness comes about (e.g., juveniles might not82
disperse independently). Generations are non-overlapping and competition83
is global. We later expand our model to include limited dispersal and over-84
lapping generations, and let relatedness vary in terms of the parameters of85
the life cycle.86
Individuals carry two social traits: (i) a cooperative trait x, determining the87
probability of contributing, at personal fecundity cost c > 0, a baseline public88
good b > 0 that is shared equally among all group members, and (ii) a cog-89
nitive trait y, determining the probability of investing into better cognition90
capabilities early in development, at personal cost d > 0. We assume that91
both traits can be expressed independently, e.g., y can be expressed even92
though x is not, and we also assume no genetic correlation between the two93
traits, such that a change in the value of one trait does not influence that of94
the other trait.95
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We assume that cognition can enhance the contribution of a focal individual96
in two different ways. First, the contribution of individuals expressing y97
might merely generate better returns compared to the baseline contribution b.98
In this case, the benefit generated is increased by an amount bC ≥ 0. Second,99
individuals expressing the y trait might interact together in order to produce100
increasingly large public goods, i.e., synergy could occur between cognitively101
enhanced individuals, with a parameter α ≥ 0 controlling synergistic effects.102
Specifically, synergy occurs when α > 0. Importantly, all individuals in the103
group enjoy an equal share of the total contributions of both normal and104
cognitively enhanced individuals.105
Following from our assumptions, the amount of public good received by a106
focal individual takes the form B(xg, yg) = xg(1 − yg)b + xgyg(b + bC)eαyg ,107
where xg and yg are the group average cooperation and cognition traits,108
respectively, in the focal individual’s group (including itself). Depending109
on the parameters bC and α, this production function covers scenarios in110
which cognition may allow for (i) larger contributions, (ii) synergism between111
cognitively enhanced contributors, or (iii) both (figure 1).112
These assumptions reflect a type of public good that is rivalrous because113
the per capita share depends on the number of consumers in the group (i.e.114
patch size n). However, our model can also reflect a non-rivalrous public good115
(e.g. cultural knowledge, such as the ability to create a tool) by multiplying116
the per capita benefit B(xg, yg) by n, so that individuals receive a public117
good which only depends on the number of contributors in the group. As118
a consequence, in the conditions for cooperation and cognition to be stable119
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Figure 1: Public good production functions. Varying both bC and α allows
us to capture different potential effects that cognition might have on the per
capita benefit from a public good that is rivalrous B(xg, yg). In case of a non-
rivalrous public good, the per capita benefit received by a focal individual is
nB(xg, yg). Parameters: xg = 1, b = 0.6.
can be recovered from Tables 1 and S1-2, except that the benefit from the120
public good need to be multiplied by n.121
With our assumptions, the fitness w of a focal individual is given by w =122
F/F¯ . Here, F = 1 − x0c − y0d + B(xg, yg) is the fecundity of the focal123
individual, where x0 and y0 are the focal’s cooperation and cognition traits,124
respectively, and F¯ = 1 − x¯c − y¯d + B(x¯, y¯) is the average fecundity in the125
population.126
We follow the approach on the joint evolution of multiple social traits of127
Brown and Taylor (2010). Specifically, we consider the successive invasion128
of mutants in one trait in a resident population that is monomorphic for129
both traits, and where a mutant for one of the two traits (holding the other130
constant) differs only slightly from that of the resident population. We as-131
sume that a mutant will be rare globally, but potentially common in the local132
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group, due to relatedness.133
We determine Hamilton’s selection gradient for both traits to investigate134
when an increase in either trait is favoured by selection (Taylor and Frank,135
1996; Frank, 1998). We denote R the relatedness of the focal individual to a136
random group member, including itself (i.e., ‘whole-group’ relatedness). For137
simplicity, we assume that relatedness is the same at both loci. Hence, the138
marginal inclusive fitness effects for cooperation and cognition are given by139
H(x, y) = ∂w/∂x0 + R∂w/∂xg and K(x, y) = ∂w/∂y0 + R∂w/∂yg respec-140
tively, where all derivatives are evaluated at x0 = xg = x and y0 = yg = y.141
We use the inclusive fitness effects above to determine when selection favours142
the evolution of cooperation and cognition by looking at when H > 0 and143
K > 0, respectively. We are mainly interested in the cases where a population144
playing full cooperation and full cognition (i.e., x∗, y∗ = 1) is stable. Hence,145
the conditions for the extreme point x, y = 1 to be convergence stable are146
if both H(1, 1) > 0 and K(1, 1) > 0. We later confirm these stability con-147
ditions, using individual-based simulations (Supplementary material; Figs.148
S6-8).149
Our expression for Hamilton’s selection gradient is in terms of ‘whole-group’150
relatedness which includes relatedness to self. However, this measure of relat-151
edness can also be expressed in terms of group size and ‘others-only’ related-152
ness Ro (Pepper, 2000), which measures the relatedness of a focal individual153
to a random member in the group (excluding the focal). By substituting154
R = (1 + (n− 1)Ro)/n into H(x, y) and K(x, y), we can determine when full155
cooperation and full cognition remain stable when varying both group size n156
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and Ro.157
3 Results158
By substituting the benefit and fitness functions into H(x, y) and K(x, y), we159
find that, assuming the population average fecundity is always positive, the160
selection gradients for cooperation H(x, y) and cognition K(x, y) are positive161
if162
[ 1 + (n− 1)Ro]
(
b
n
(1− y) + y b+ bC
n
eαy
)
> c (1a)
x[ 1 + (n− 1)Ro]
(
b+ bC
n
eαy(1 + αy)− b
n
)
> d, (1b)
respectively. Both selection gradients comprise the marginal returns from co-163
operation and cognition (last term on the left hand side in Ineq.(1)), weighted164
by relatedness of the individual to itself (i.e., 1) and to the other n−1 group165
members. Table 1 provides a summary of the conditions for full coopera-166
tion and full cognition (x, y = 1) to be favoured. Table S1 gives the same167
conditions in the absence of relatedness (Ro = 0).168
In the Supplementary Information (§1), we consider a more explicit life cycle,169
where relatedness within patches emerges as a consequence of demographic170
processes, such as the probability of adult survival s and juvenile dispersal171
m Taylor (1992); Taylor and Irwin (2000). We find that the conditions for172
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cooperation and cognition to be favoured remain the same as in Ineq.(1) and173
Table (1), except that Ro is replaced by κ = {2(1−m)s}/{n[2−m(1− s)] +174
2(1−m)s}, where κ is the scaled relatedness coefficient which is demograph-175
ically scaled so as to capture the effect of both increased genetic assortment176
and increased local competition between kin (Lehmann and Rousset, 2010).177
Our value of κ recovers that presented in Lehmann and Rousset (2010) for178
this life-cycle.179
3.1 The evolution of cooperation180
We first consider the evolution of cooperation, assuming no cognition in the181
population (y → 0). In this case, cooperation will be favoured if, and only182
if (n − 1)Rob/n > c − b/n (Fig.2a; Fig.S1). That is, if the benefits received183
from the proportion of relatives among the n− 1 group members are greater184
than the net cost of contributing (i.e., cost of contribution minus own share).185
In other words, the indirect fitness benefits need to outweigh the direct fit-186
ness cost. This condition is Hamilton’s Rule for the linear public goods187
game (Bijma and Aanen, 2010; Ohtsuki, 2014). Selection for cooperation is188
frequency-independent, and so the population will always converge towards189
full cooperation if Hamilton’s Rule is satisfied. However, assuming b/n < c,190
cooperation can never be favoured in the absence of relatedness, in which191
case the population will converge towards full defection.192
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3.2 The evolution of cognition193
If there is a sufficient level of cooperation in the population, then cognition194
can be favoured. Specifically, if x∗ ≥ d/{[1 + (n − 1)Ro]bC/n} (Fig.2b).195
Here, both larger d and n increase the required amount of cooperation for196
cognition to be favoured, while larger bC and Ro decrease it. Assuming that197
cooperation has fully invaded the population (x = 1), then cognition will198
invade if [ 1 + (n − 1)RobC/n] > d. The initial invasion of cognition does199
not depend synergy, because cognition can only provide synergistic returns if200
there is already some cognition in the population (i.e., y > 0). Consequently,201
if cognition only allows synergy, but no larger additive returns, then cognition202
can never increase from rarity (i.e., K(x, 0) < 0 if d > 0 and bC = 0).203
However, this follows from our assumption of weak selection with continuous204
phenotypes, and would not necessarily occur with discrete phenotypes and205
strong selection.206
3.3 The coevolution of cooperation and cognition207
If cognition is favoured and increases in the population, it will in turn increase208
the selection pressure on cooperation, and vice versa. This is because, as the209
level of cognition (cooperation) increases in the population, the cognitively210
enhanced cooperators benefit increasingly from both their own contribution211
and that of their relatives. This can be seen from Ineq.(1), where H and K212
are increasing in y and x, respectively. The population will then converge213
towards full cooperation and full cognition (i.e., x, y = 1).214
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To summarise, cooperation can only evolve if there is sufficient relatedness215
Ro and benefits b (for a given c), whereas cognition can only evolve if there216
is sufficient cooperation (x∗), relatedness and benefits from cognition bC (for217
a given d). In all cases, increasing group size n hinders the evolution of both218
traits. Therefore, it follows that the population can only end up in one of219
three different states: (i) full defection and no cognition, (ii) full cooperation220
and no cognition, and (iii) full cooperation and cognition.221
The analytical conditions for full cooperation and cognition to be stable are222
summarised in Table 1. Full cooperation with full cognition is favoured by223
increasing the additional gains allowed by cognition (bC), synergy (α) and224
relatedness (Ro) but disfavoured by increasing group size n and the cost225
of either cooperation c or cognition d (Fig.2a). In the absence of synergy,226
only the stability of cooperation, but not that of cognition, increases with227
increasing baseline benefit b. In contrast, with synergy only, increasing b228
increases the stability of both traits.229
3.4 The transition from high to low relatedness230
Assuming that a population has converged towards full cooperation and cog-231
nition, how stable would this population be in case of a subsequent decrease232
in relatedness? We can answer this by substituting Ro = 0 into the conditions233
shown in Table 1 which gives the results in Table S1.234
The results depend upon the type of benefits provided by cognition. If cog-235
nition only allows for larger benefits from cooperation, then cooperation is236
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Figure 2: Invasion and stability conditions for cooperation and cognition. (a)
Parameter space where full cooperation is stable (and can invade), with and
without cognition, as a function of relatedness and the per capita benefit to
cost ratio from cooperation (scaled by group size n). Increasing the synergy
factor α increases the stability of full cooperation, even without relatedness
(Ro = 0). (b) Level of cooperation required for cognition to invade, in
function of relatedness and the per capita share to cost ratio from cognition
(scaled by group size n). Parameters: in (a) bC = 2.5; in both panels n = 15,
c = 0.1, d = 0.05.
stable if the share from the public good (b + bC)/n exceeds the cost of con-237
tributing c, whereas cognition is stable if the share from the benefit of cog-238
nition (bC/n) exceeds the cost of cognition d.239
In contrast, if cognition only allows for synergy (bC = 0 and α > 0) then co-240
operation and cognition can be stable under less stringent conditions, and in-241
creasing synergy increases their stability. Finally, if cognition allows for both242
larger gains and synergy between cognitively enhanced individuals (bC > 0243
and α > 0), then full cooperation and full cognition are stable over an even244
wider range of parameter space (Fig.2a; Fig.S2-5). As before, increasing245
patch size n disfavours cooperation and cognition, such that there is a thresh-246
old patch size above which they will not be stable (Fig.S2-5). In our more247
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explicit life-cycle, selection for cooperation and cognition decreases if the248
scaled relatedness coefficient κ decreases. This occurs if migration m and249
patch size n increase, or if survival s decreases (Supplementary information250
§1).251
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3.5 Computer simulations252
We use individual-based simulations to confirm whether a population at the253
equilibrium can remain stable even as relatedness decreases. We give a de-254
tailed description of the simulation model in the supplementary material255
(§2). We start our simulations with different levels of relatedness, and half-256
way through, we reduce relatedness to a value of Ro = 1/100. We then check257
the long-term average of both cooperation and cognition in the population.258
All simulations were run for 106 generations.259
As predicted by our analytical model, full cooperation and full cognition re-260
mained locked even after a drop in relatedness, provided sufficient synergy261
and additive gains from cognition (Fig.3, Fig.S7-8). In the absence of cogni-262
tion and whenever the direct benefits from cooperation and cognition were263
too low, populations which initially evolved cooperation were invaded by de-264
fectors as soon as relatedness decreased to negligible values. We confirmed265
these results for a large range of parameter values (Fig.S6-8).266
3.6 Machiavellian cognition267
So far, we have assumed that cognition was beneficial for all group members,268
because the presence of cognitively enhanced individuals increased the share269
received by each of their patch members. However, it has been argued that270
cognition could be used for selfish profits through manipulation and deception271
of social partners (the ’Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis’; Byrne and272
Whiten (1989); Whiten and Byrne (1997)). In this section, we explore how273
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this negative aspect of cognition affects its coevolution with cooperation.274
We expand our baseline model by assuming that relatively more intelligent275
individuals can exploit their partners by taking more than their fair share of276
the public good, e.g. through manipulation. Specifically, the benefit received277
by a focal individual with cognition y0 is now B(xg, yg)(1 + gy0)/(1 + gyg).278
The parameter g controls the magnitude of exploitation in the following way:279
if g → 0 or if y0 = yg, a focal individual will receive the same public good280
share as everyone else. If y0 6= yg and g → ∞, the focal individual will281
receive a proportion y0/yg of the per capita benefit from the public good.282
Here, the cognition trait is analogous to the exploitation trait investigated283
in Brown and Taylor (2010), except that cognition can increase and, at the284
same time, decrease the public good benefit to others if α, bC > 0 and g > 0,285
respectively.286
The selection pressure on cooperation does not change in this scenario (sup-287
plementary information §3). This comes from the fact that cognition still288
has the same effect on the public good created as in the baseline model.289
However, if there is cooperation in the population, the selection pressure for290
cognition is considerably larger than in our baseline model (Table S2, Fig.291
S9). This is because larger b and g also increase the marginal benefit from292
cognition. So, cognition can invade from rarity even in the absence of re-293
latedness, if there is a sufficient level of cooperation in the population (i.e.,294
x∗ ≥ dn/[ bC + bg(n − 1)] ). As a consequence, full cognition is also stable295
under a larger area of parameter space (Table S2). Full cognition can even be296
stable even in the absence of both larger benefits and synergism (bC , a = 0).297
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This is not surprising, because in a population with full cooperation and full298
cognition, a focal mutant with a lower level of cognition will be exploited by299
its partners.300
We also find that increasing relatedness can sometimes have a negative effect301
on the evolution of Machiavellian cognition (supplementary information §3).302
The reason is that exploiting partners leads to indirect fitness costs if too303
many partners are relatives. In the extreme case where cognitively enhanced304
individuals produce neither larger, nor synergistic benefits (bC , α = 0), higher305
relatedness always hinders the evolution of cognition (supplementary infor-306
mation §3).307
4 Discussion308
We found that coevolution between cooperation and cognition can lead to309
a transition in the nature of the cooperative dilemma—from a state where310
cooperation can only evolve and be maintained with sufficient relatedness,311
to a state where it is stable even without relatedness. In small groups of312
related individuals, cooperation can evolve (Fig.2b). If cognition enables313
individuals to either generate larger gains from cooperation and/or exploit314
less intelligent partners, then cognition can invade into cooperative societies315
(Fig.2b). When cooperation and cognition are both favoured, an increase in316
either trait will increase selection pressure for the other trait, leading to an317
evolutionary feedback loop until the population has converged toward full318
cooperation and cognition. At this point, if relatedness drops via an increase319
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in either group size or dispersal, such that cooperation on its own would not320
have been favoured, the combination of cooperation and cognition can still321
be stable. Cognition can therefore lead to a population being ‘locked’ in a322
stable cooperative state (Fig.2-3).323
4.1 Cooperation and cognition324
Cognition can only evolve in our model if there is a sufficient level of coopera-325
tion in the population (Fig.2b). We focused on relatedness as the underlying326
factor promoting the emergence of cooperation. That relatedness can often327
play a key role in the evolution of cooperation, in scenarios where it is then328
less important for its maintenance, as has also been argued with reciprocity,329
punishment, and group augmentation (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Kokko330
et al., 2001; Gardner and West, 2004; West et al., 2007; Andre´, 2015). How-331
ever, we believe that our conclusion on how cognition could have transformed332
the type of dilemmas faced by early humans does not rely on relatedness. In333
fact, processes where an additional trait can transform the payoff matrix334
into a game where cooperation maximises selfish profits have been argued to335
be common in nature (Bshary et al., 2016). Cooperation could have been336
promoted if individuals within groups depended on each other’s cooperation337
to survive against predators, environmental catastrophes, or other groups338
(the ‘interdependence hypothesis’; Roberts (2005); Tomasello et al. (2012);339
Reader et al. (2011); Kokko et al. (2001); Keeley (1997); Gavrilets (2015)).340
In turn, cooperation is likely to have introduced selection pressures on indi-341
viduals to benefit from cooperation even more, or at a reduced cost (Bshary342
19
et al., 2016). For example, Gavrilets (2015) showed that cooperation and343
cognition could evolve without relatedness when groups compete with each344
other. Gavrilets investigated a different productivity function for the baseline345
public good, and cognition did not have any synergistic effects on cooper-346
ation. Therefore, cognition in his model did not change the nature of the347
cooperative dilemma in the same way as in our model, and so cooperation348
might not remain stable if inter-group conflict becomes less frequent.349
We also found that, if cognition does not allow for exploitation of others,350
it could evolve only if cognitively enhanced individuals are able to generate351
larger amounts of public goods (Fig.2b). The kin benefits from cognition352
need to outweigh the cost of developing cognition, which implies sufficiently353
high relatedness between partners and gains from cognition. However, our354
assumption that cognition provides benefits only through group cooperation355
is restrictive. In nature, cognition might have provided benefits in various356
additional contexts, such as tool making or foraging, thereby favouring its357
evolution (Rosati, 2017).358
Furthermore, we found that synergy is not important for the invasion of359
cognition. This is because cognition cannot provide significant synergistic360
returns to rare mutants, unless there is already some level of cognition in the361
population. On the other hand, synergy is crucial for the stability of both362
traits in the absence of relatedness (Fig.2a; Fig.3). Biologically, synergy363
could occur if cognition allows high coordination between hunters, via the364
use of planning and sign language, or acting in function of the other hunters’365
movement (Boesch, 2002). The stabilising effect of synergism on cooperation366
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is well-known (Motro, 1991; Hauert et al., 2006; Archetti and Scheuring,367
2011, 2012; Ohtsuki, 2012; Pen˜a et al., 2015). However, most previous studies368
investigating non-linear production functions focused on a single cooperative369
trait (although see Brown and Taylor (2010)). In contrast, we separated370
synergistic cooperation into two different traits. This allowed us to determine371
how both cooperation and synergistic cognition alter the selection pressure372
on each other.373
4.2 Machiavellian cognition374
We have also shown that cognition initially evolves and remains stable more375
readily if it allows the exploitation of less intelligent partners (Machiavel-376
lian intelligence hypothesis; Byrne and Whiten (1989); Whiten and Byrne377
(1997)). This is in line with previous studies which found that cooperation378
creates selection pressures for higher cognitive abilities leading to the decep-379
tion and manipulation of others (McNally et al., 2012; McNally and Jack-380
son, 2013). Our scenario is also very similar to that in Brown and Taylor381
(2010), where cooperation coevolves with an exploitative trait that reduces382
the amount of public good for personal profit. Our model complements these383
studies as we have incorporated both the beneficial and harmful consequences384
of cognition. This revealed that both Machiavellian and beneficial cognition385
can evolve together, provided the beneficial effect of cognition on the public386
good is sufficiently large. This suggests that, in accordance with the ‘social387
intelligence hypothesis’, cognition could have evolved due to its various ef-388
fects on social interactions (Reader et al., 2011; Dunbar, 1998; Byrne and389
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Whiten, 1989; Whiten and Byrne, 1997; Tomasello et al., 2005). On the390
other hand, we showed that in the absence of greater benefits from cognition391
(bC , α = 0), Machiavellian cognition evolves more easily in groups with low,392
rather than high relatedness, as was previously suggested (McNally et al.,393
2012).394
4.3 Key predictions395
Our model can be validated by either testing our assumptions or predictions.396
First, one of our assumptions was that cognition rapidly increases the ben-397
efits (or decreases the costs) of cooperation, i.e., there is synergy between398
cognitively enhanced individuals. Because it is difficult to determine cogni-399
tion in real world collective actions, a starting point would be to estimate it400
indirectly. One proxy for cognition would be the level of specialisation (skills401
acquired through learning) required for hunting parties in modern hunter-402
gathers. Hence, demonstrating synergy requires showing that, for example,403
the success rate of groups with ten specialised hunters is more than twice404
that of groups with five specialised hunters. An important point here is to405
control for observability, because hunters in smaller groups might be more406
isolated from each other, thereby providing more opportunities for cheating.407
Specialised hunters might also simply be better at detecting cheats. Second,408
our prediction that cognition allows for the maintenance of cooperation in409
the absence of other promoting factors can be tested in laboratory experi-410
ments, by artificially manipulating cognition. A possible experiment would411
be to recreate a situation similar to that in our Fig.3. For example, in a412
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cooperative task where coordination (or learning) provides larger benefits,413
cooperation could be initially promoted (e.g. through global competition414
West et al. (2006)). Then, the cooperation-promoting mechanism could be415
removed halfway through. We would then expect cooperation to remain sta-416
ble in a treatment where coordination/learning is allowed, compared to when417
it is not allowed.418
Third, another prediction from our model is that cognition allows stable co-419
operation levels without relatedness or any enforcement mechanism, such420
as reciprocity, partner choice or punishment (West et al., 2007). Indeed,421
enforcement mechanisms usually require cognition and can also maintain co-422
operation without relatedness (West et al., 2007; Bshary et al., 2016). Hence,423
one way to validate our prediction would be to compare relatedness between424
social partners across different cooperative tasks within primate species. We425
would then expect lower relatedness between social partners and the ab-426
sence of partner control in those cooperative tasks that are more cognitively427
demanding. Finally, a more general prediction is that we expect more coop-428
eration in more intelligent species. This could be tested with comparative429
analyses on different primate species, by looking at the correlation between430
between cooperation and relatedness, and including cognition as a covariate.431
This is already partially supported by the positive correlation between co-432
operation and deception observed in primates (McNally and Jackson, 2013).433
As before, an important point here will be to distinguish between cases of434
cooperation with and without partner control mechanisms.435
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Figure 3: Joint evolution of cooperation and cognition in individual-based
simulations. We compare the stability of cooperation (a) and cognition (b),
with and without cognition. In both panels, the blue (grey) line represents
the same simulation run with (without) cognition. In the run with cognition,
the synergy factor α = 0.4. Relatedness was decreased half-way through
each run (i.e., k = 10 and k = 100 in the first and second half, respectively,
with Ro = 1/k). Parameters: n = 15, c = 1, b = 7, d = 0.5, bC = 3.5,
µh = µc = 0.01, σ = 0.01.
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